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Unconventional resources, particularly shale reservoirs, are a significant 
component in oil and gas production in the United States as they represent (as of May 2015) 
48 and 58 percent, respectively, of the total oil and gas produced. However, there has been 
a deceleration on oil and gas production in general because of low market prices. The 
drastic decline in oil and gas prices that started in 2014 has companies struggling to 
continue their operations, resulting in negative financial outcomes for 2015 for most 
companies. The present work examines the financial results of three companies, EOG 
Resources, Pioneer Natural Resources, and Chesapeake Energy, along with their particular 
well productivity using the Logistic Growth model to forecast production in one of the 
most prolific shale plays in the United States, the Eagle Ford. This work also examines the 
economic feasibility of drilling new wells when oil prices are low using a discounted cash 
flow model for each company. The financial analysis shows that from the three companies, 
Pioneer Natural Resources has the best financial results; its high cash-flow-to-debt ratio, 
and low debt and debt-to-equity ratios make it an attractive company to invest in. In 
 vii 
contrast, Chesapeake has the worst results which represents high risk for investors, and 
EOG has moderate results that still make it a good company to invest in. The discounted 
cash flow model demonstrate that under the cost assumptions and estimated production 
used in this work, EOG gets the best results from their wells located in the Eagle Ford with 
break-even prices bordering the 40 $/bbl compared to the other companies with break-even 
prices above 87 $/bbl for Pioneer and 89 $/bbl for Chesapeake. From the discounted cash 
flow model, it can also be concluded that none of the companies in the analysis is expected 
to gain revenue from drilling new wells if oil prices are under 40 $/bbl, and that companies 
that are quick to respond to the low prices by reducing their drilling and completion costs 
can significantly improve their well economics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The extraction of unconventional resources from shale rocks has spurred an 
exponential growth of oil and gas well drilling and has changed the energy landscape not 
only in the United States but also worldwide. For the United States, unconventional oil 
production was 4.6 million barrels per day as of May 2015, which represents 48% of total 
U.S. oil production. Regarding natural gas, the domestic dry shale gas production was 41.5 
billion standard cubic feet as of May 2015, which represents 58% of total U.S. natural gas 
production (U.S. EIA, 2015). This scenario has changed the country’s energy portfolio, 
especially with the cheap supply of natural gas reducing the U.S. imports, and contributing 
to the national goal of being energy independent (on natural gas). 
However, in the ever changing economy, oil and gas companies have experienced a recent 
setback because of low market prices. The drastic decline in oil and gas prices in 2014 has 
companies struggling to continue their operations as their financial results show net income 
losses by year-end 2015, which have resulted in the revaluation and sale of non-core assets 
to raise capital. 
 Despite this environment, many companies have continued to drill even with 
apparently adverse economic results. Questions arise when analyzing their cash flow and 
balance sheets such as: Is it profitable to drill under current cost structures when prices are 
low? What is the breakeven price? What strategies are companies using to stay afloat? 
 The thesis aims to answer the previous questions by analyzing financial ratios and 
well economics of shale formations using the Eagle Ford Shale as reference case. A 
multiscenario analysis is performed to understand the principal variables that improve the 




cost structures and production volumes of three companies: EOG Resources, Pioneer 
Natural Resources, and Chesapeake Energy. 
 This section is followed by seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents a brief explanation 
of the oil market emphasizing the complex and dynamic interactions of the variables that 
determine oil and gas prices. Chapter 3 describes the principal factors affecting well 
economics: production decline rates and costs; and their differences when evaluating wells 
in shale formations compared to wells in conventional reservoirs. In Chapter 4, I discuss 
the impact of low oil prices on companies’ finances and operations, as well as strategies 
used by companies to minimize risk in times of uncertainty. Chapter 5 includes a 
description of the selected companies in the study including production and reserves 
volumes, and the results and analysis of the companies’ financial ratios. In Chapter 6, I 
evaluate two different methods for the development of a production model using wells 
located in the Eagle Ford. Three individual production models are developed for each of 
the companies in the study. Chapter 7 uses the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach to 
determine the economic feasibility of drilling a typical well in the Eagle Ford for each 
company in the study. A multiscenario analysis is used to determine the break-even price 
for each company, as well as to perform a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 presents 





Chapter 2: The oil market 
 The price of oil has an important impact on economic activity and our lives. Of all 
the energy sources, oil and its products represent the largest energy expenditure compared 
to any other individual energy source or technology; therefore, it has a significant impact 
on the economy (King et al., 2015). For modern civilization, oil plays an important role 
because it is crucial to meet transportation needs until we find an accessible alternative fuel 
that aligns to our current budgets and travel time disposition (Ausubel, 2014).  
 The financial concerns associated with the future oil price and its relationship with 
a country’s economy also affect other commodity markets such as other energy 
commodities, metals, and agriculture. For this reason, many analysts have created models 
to attempt forecasting oil prices; but reality has shown that the dynamics driving it are 
complex and many times unpredictable. In 2014 when the oil prices started declining 
rapidly, many industry specialists were certain that the price would not fall below 40 $/bbl 
or similar estimates. 2015, proved they were wrong.  
 In this chapter, I present a brief history of oil and natural gas prices, and some of 
the factors that play an important role to understand fluctuating prices.  
2.1. Understanding oil and natural gas prices 
  Understanding the mechanisms that drive oil prices is especially important for oil 
companies, since a bad forecast can terribly hurt them. In 1998 when prices were around 
10 $/bbl, specialists forecasted that prices would not go back up in the short term. Based 
on this, many companies hedged their production at 10 to 15 $/bbl (Carollo, 2012) and 
faced the consequences when prices started increasing in 1999, and then picked in 2001 






Figure 2.1. Oil prices and historical events 1970-2014 (Source: U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2015). 
 There are various modeling approaches when trying to forecast oil prices. These 
models attempt to predict the price behavior given different factors and their interactions. 
Some models include regression, time series, and artificial neural networks among others. 
Based on research studies, regression models are weak because they depend on forecasting 
other variables to forecast oil prices (De Souza e Silva at al., 2010), and time series models 
are not useful because oil prices exhibit a nonlinear behavior (Xie et al., 2006). Artificial 
neural networks and a combination of other models seem to be promising (De Souza e 
Silva at al., 2010); but it is difficult to include all the variables in this intricate system when 




 Ultimately, oil price is determined by the economic model of supply and demand 
balance. However, supply and demand are affected by outside forces with many interacting 
factors including: geopolitical events, discoveries of new oil reserves, the financial and 
economic status of global economies, new energy sources and technologies, weather 
conditions, and decisions by oil producers including OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) and North American oil companies among others.  Thus, it is very 
difficult to model these complex and dynamic interactions.  
 The demand part of the price function is largely driven by economic development 
around the world (Sorkhabi, 2008). Economic development translates into an increment in 
energy demand, especially in developing countries as they try to improve their standard of 
living. Countries with large populations, such as India and China, have had a rapid 
economic growth over the past decade and have drastically increased their demand for oil. 
Additionally, the demand is also affected by competition with new energy sources that at 
the same time is driven by an increasing concern for the environment.  
 On the other hand, the supply part of the price function is driven by new oil 
discoveries (reserves additions), spare capacity of oil fields, spare capacity or lack thereof 
in refineries (for petroleum products), OPEC and independent oil company decisions, and 
even some unpredictable events like natural disasters and geopolitical events including 
wars and political instability, especially in OPEC nations.  
 Let us discuss the OPEC’s role further. OPEC manages the oil production of its 
member nations by setting quotas. From the world’s oil production in 2015, OPEC nations 
produced 40% of the total, and their exports represented about 60% of the total oil traded 
worldwide (U.S. EIA, Feb. 9, 2016). Furthermore, geopolitical events affecting OPEC 




This situation partially explains why oil prices go up when the OPEC production quotas 
are reduced. Other factors mentioned before also play a part in the final price.  
 As for natural gas, the Henry Hub is the pricing point for natural gas future contracts 
representing overall market conditions in the United States and used to compare the 
relationship between oil and natural gas prices. Supply and demand balance is still the main 
driver of natural gas prices; and like oil, it is also affected by reserves, production output, 
storage, weather, and seasonality.  
 One important characteristic about natural gas is that its consumption is seasonal 
but its production is not. This seasonality leads to higher prices during winter and lower 
prices during summer because of its use in heating and cooling systems. More natural gas 
tends to be used for heating northern U.S. cities during winter than for generating power to 
run air conditioning in southern U.S. cities during summer.  
2.2. Oil price vs. natural gas price 
 The disparity between oil and natural gas prices can largely be attributed to the 
differences between their energy content. Natural gas is priced in dollars per million BTU 
and oil is priced in dollars per barrel. To be comparable, it is an industry standard to use a 
5.8 to 1 ratio, given that a barrel of oil produces 5.8 million BTUs of energy.  
 The difference in price per BTU also resides in their physical state. Natural gas is 
not as easy to transport because of its gaseous state, although infrastructure deployment 
has increased worldwide over the past decade. On the other hand, oil is easily transportable 
because of its liquid form making it the No.1 energy commodity worldwide (McGuire, 
2015). However, this makes oil prices more volatile given its vulnerability to events that 




 Natural gas price fluctuations generally followed those of crude oil; and substitution 
and competition between oil and natural gas seemed to be the link between their prices 
(Brown and Yucel, 2008). However, after the crisis of 2008, natural gas prices continued 











Figure 2.2. WTI oil prices and Henry Hub natural gas prices 2000-2015 (Source: 
McGuire, 2015). 
 Over the past decade in the U.S., advances in extraction techniques from 
unconventional reservoirs have allowed the production of amounts of both oil and natural 
gas in very significant quantities that were not previously anticipated. From Figure 2.3, it 
can be observed that the United States’ dry gas production from shale reservoirs started 
increasing rapidly in 2007 when it accounted for 5% of the total production. By 2013 shale 








































increased in the total production of natural gas is a determining factor for the low gas prices 
experienced since 2008 and the disparity between oil and gas prices trends. 
Figure 2.3. Shale gas production as a percentage of total U.S. dry gas production 2000-
2013 (Source: U.S. EIA, 2013). 
2.3. Oil price history 
The majority of the abrupt changes in oil price can be explained both by geopolitical 
events and supply-demand imbalances affected by both production and consumption 
technologies (see Figure 2.1). 
For example, the first oil shock was a result of the Yom Kippur War/Arab embargo 
in 1973 when the nominal price increased from 4.31 $/bbl to 10.11 $/bbl. The second oil 
shock increased the oil price from 15.85 $/bbl to 39.50 $/bbl; and started in 1978 due to 
the Iranian Revolution and picked in 1980 as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. The first abrupt 




(Carollo, 2012). In the same way, the Gulf War, Iraq War, and the financial crisis of 2008 
were the primary reasons to the changes in oil price for those years. 
2.3.1. The crisis of 2008 
 The oil price collapse of 2008 was something never seen in the history of the oil 
industry. Crude oil prices fell abruptly from almost 140 $/bbl to under 40 $/bbl. It was not 
the result of a decline in oil demand; in fact, there was an increase on the global demand 
of around 2 million bbls/day and a reduction in the production of about the same amount 
(Carollo, 2012) contradicting the law of supply and demand. This was a special case. The 
crash of international financial institutions was a detonator to burst the oil bubble by 
affecting daily trades of oil contracts on financial markets; and therefore, bringing down 
the price of oil (Carollo, 2012). 
 In this situation, the OPEC tried to remediate the situation by implementing cuts in 
production. However, this action did not prevent the price from continuing downwards; 
and confirmed that OPEC’s decisions are not always the determinant factor on the 
dynamics of crude oil prices (Carollo, 2012). 
2.3.2. Current oil price 
 The drop in oil price that started in June 2014 was triggered largely by continued 
oversupply when demand was not growing at the same level, along with financial concerns 
in Europe and Asia, uncertainty in equity and non-energy commodity markets, high 
inventory levels of crude oil, and Iran’s compliance on the nuclear deal lifting the sanctions 
which will rise Iranian crude oil exports (U.S. EIA, Feb. 2016; OPEC, Aug. 2015). Since 




of the overall trend as observed in Figure 2.4. The WTI price as of February 2016 is 32.15 
$/bbl which represents a decrease of 69.4% compared to June 2014. 
 
 Figure 2.4. WTI Oil price history from January 2012 to May 2016 (Source: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, May 2016). 
As previously explained, there are many factors affecting prices; and in the past, 
OPEC has tried to help maintaining prices at a certain level. However, it is unlikely that 
countries such as Saudi Arabia will lower their production as a strategy to slow the 
development of new energy sources which have increased the production of the United 
States and Canada in recent years.  
The current situation limits new production, which, in theory, should allow for a 
modest rise of oil prices because of the supply and demand law. The current global 
projection for oil demand predicts growth of about 1.3 million barrels per day propelled by 























petrochemicals in China, Unites States, and Asia-Pacific (OPEC, Feb. 2016). However, as 





Chapter 3: Economic aspects of shale reservoirs 
 The economic feasibility of production from shale rocks differs from conventional 
reservoirs in many aspects. First, conventional reservoirs have been studied and produced 
for longer; and, their production forecasting can be achieved by using traditional methods, 
while production from shale rocks is relatively new. Therefore, there is limited experience 
forecasting production from shales and tight sands. This limited experience with shale 
production can bring great uncertainty when evaluating the economics of these reservoirs 
as it greatly depends on production volumes. Second, shale formations are difficult and 
expensive to develop. From well design to the handling of flow-back water, costs 
associated to shale reservoirs can affect or delay the development of a play.  
 In this chapter, I describe the principal factors affecting well economics: production 
decline rates and costs, in addition to how these vary between shale wells and wells in 
conventional reservoirs. Costs are divided in three categories to have a better understanding 
of what is included in each: capital costs, operation costs, and financing costs.   
3.1. Production decline rates 
 The extraction of hydrocarbons from shale reservoirs is relatively new and still 
needs more data and experience to reduce uncertainty when drawing assumptions for these 
plays. Still, the limited data available from existing wells suggests that production declines 
more rapidly in shale wells than in conventional vertical wells (Lake et al., 2013). A shale 
well can reach its total production within the first five years in contrast to the projected 
thirty-year longevity for most conventional wells. As a result, companies must continue 
drilling, as well as to use re-fracturing and enhanced oil recovery techniques to maintain 




 Initial production of a well typically bears some correlation with the expected 
cumulative production during the life of the well. As technology improves and companies 
find and target sweet spots, initial production has seen a constant increase allowing 
companies to extract more oil during the initial months of production, a trend that can be 
observed across different plays. One example is the Eagle Ford Shale that has seen a 
continuous improvement in initial productivity (see Figure 3.1). The targeting of sweet 
spots to maximize initial production has allowed companies to be resilient despite decline 
rates that can reach up to 79% for the first year, like in the Niobrara Shale, or can be as low 
as 18% for the first year like in the Monterey-Temblor Shale. Decline rates for the first 
year in some Texas shale plays are: 60% for the Eagle Ford, 65% for the Barnett, and 66% 
for the Permian (Hughes, 2013). 
 
Figure 3.1. Average oil production per well in the Eagle Ford (Source: U.S. Energy 







 The variations on costs primarily depend on the location’s geology, well depth, and 
water management and disposal options. 
3.2.1. Capital costs 
 Capital costs or capital expenditures (CAPEX) are funds invested by a company to 
start a new project or to improve the useful life of an existing capital asset. CAPEX 
typically consists on geological and geophysical (G&G) costs, drilling costs, tankers, 
facilities, pipelines, and other items. However, when analyzing the economics of shale 
plays, the approach is usually centered in the economic feasibility of drilling a new well or 
a group of wells in a certain area where the G&G costs can be omitted as shale reservoirs 
have little discovery risk and very few wells are unproductive (Lake et al, 2013). 
Additionally, economic analysis on a well by well basis in an already productive play also 
disregards facilities and pipelines costs because these were already considered when 
evaluating the initial development of the play. Under this approach, CAPEX are composed 
in its majority by drilling and completion costs (D&C), and to a lesser extent by 
abandonment costs. At the same time, D&C can be divided into intangible and tangible 
costs. Intangible costs are not part of the final operating well which usually include service 
fees, fluids, rented equipment, and expendable equipment. Tangible costs are the opposite 
and often include casings, equipment, and other tangibles. Abandonment costs are 
associated with the environmentally safe abandonment of a well and facilities at the end of 
its economic life. 
 In contrast to conventional wells, shale wells need additional operations after 
drilling for them to produce. These operations are those for hydraulic fracturing, a well-




includes the blend of water with sand and chemicals, is injected into the ground in order to 
create fractures in shale rocks to increase the flow of hydrocarbons from a well. Depending 
on the depth of the geological formation, fracturing activities can take place from several 
hundred feet to several miles underground. Hydraulic fracturing is part of the completion 
cost; and it significantly contributes to the increased capital cost of putting a well into 
production as it accounts for the largest portion of D&C. Table 3.1 shows the typical cost 
breakdown for D&C in the Eagle Ford from which drilling represents 38% of the total cost 
and completion represents 62%. 
  $ Thousands 
DRILLING   
Set Up costs  $         215.00  
35 Rig days @20k/d  $         700.00  
Fluids, chemicals, transportation & fuel  $         270.00  
Services & rental equipment  $         540.00  
Bits, expendable equipment & Misc.  $            60.00  
Labor, engineering & overhead  $            70.00  
Casing and other tangibles  $         190.00  
Contingencies  $         240.00  
Plugging and abandonment  $         100.00  
Sub-total for drilling  $      2,385.00  
COMPLETION   
Set up  $            35.00  
Rig & daywork  $         115.00  
Fluid, chemicals, transportation & fuel  $            66.00  
Services & rental equipment  $         208.00  
Formation Stimulation  $      2,760.00  
Expendable equipment & Misc.  $            19.00  
Casing and other tangibles  $         430.00  
Contingencies  $         325.00  
Sub-Total for completion  $      3,958.00  
    
Total D&C budget  $      6,343.00  
Table 3.1. Typical budget for a well in the Eagle Ford Shale for the year 2011 (Source: 




 Drilling and completion costs vary across and within plays depending on the 
geology of the area, its complexity, and well design (lateral length and fracture stages). In 
2015, drilling costs ranged from 90 to 180 $/ft, and completion costs were between 400 
and 800 $/ft (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016). For the Eagle Ford Shale, these costs per foot were 
approximately 150 $/ft and 700 $/ft for drilling and completion respectively in the same 
time period (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016).  
From Table 3.1, the largest component of the completion cost is formation 
stimulation which refers to hydraulic fracturing; a process that uses large amounts of water. 
It is estimated that 2 to 4 million gallons of water per horizontal well are typically required 
for hydraulic fracturing. (Wang et al., 2014). This is problematic in drought prone areas 
such as west Texas. As a result, companies are forced to come up with better solutions for 
the amount of water used by changing to other fluids or by adopting techniques that allow 
them to re-use or recycle water. Adopting these techniques has the additional benefit of 
reducing costs, for some plays, compared to hauling water in or out.  
 Another component of hydraulic fracturing is the proppant used in the fracking 
fluid which keeps fractures opened allowing the flow of hydrocarbons. The proppant is 
typically sand, also called “frac-sand”; but artificial materials such as man-made ceramic 
are also used. Frac-sand prices vary depending on its quality. In the United States, the 
freight on board (FOB) price for the year 2015 ranged from 60 to 150 $/ton with an average 
of 67 $/ton (Rock Products, 2015). In the Eagle Ford Shale, proppant costs are higher due 
to heavy reliance on artificial proppant. Additionally, gas prone areas where pressure is 
high increases proppant use and completion cost (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016) 
 As the industry continues to evolve, improvements in drilling and completion 




well performance. Improvements in drilling technology include longer laterals, improved 
geo-steering, increased drilling rates, minimal casing and liner, and multi-pad drilling 
among others. In the same way, improvements in completion technology include number 
of fracturing stages, shift to hybrid fluid systems, and spacing optimization (U.S. EIA, Mar. 
2016). In 2015, hydraulic fracturing costs dropped over 40% compared to 2012 despite 
much larger completions with more stages (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016). Technological advances 
play an important part on cost reductions; but it also can be partially attributed to the low 
oil price environment which has resulted in a decrease of drilling activity and, 
consequently, a demand decrease for field services. Because of this, service companies 
have responded to the low demand by reducing their fees, which in the Eagle Ford Shale 
has contributed to a drop of 25% on average in costs (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016). Additionally, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, drilling rates dipped by 19.6% from June 2014 
to May 2015, the price of frac-sand declined by 12.5%, whereas the rates for support 
activities, which include the surveying, cementing, casing and treatment of wells only 
dipped by 1.4% in the same timeframe (Blum, 2015). 
3.2.2. Operation costs 
Operation costs (OPEX), also referred to as lease operating expenditures (LOE), 
occur periodically and are necessary for daily operations. These costs are usually expressed 
in expenditure per year or per unit of production, and typically include: utilities, 
maintenance, administrative and general (A&G) overhead, production costs, transportation 
of the product to delivery points, evacuation costs, and insurance costs (Mian, 2002).   
OPEX are highly variable ranging from 9 to 24.50 $/boe1 influenced by location, 
play type, well performance, and company efficiency (U.S. EIA, Mar. 2016). In the case 
                                                 




of Eagle Ford’s oil wells, OPEX is dominated by artificial lift and water disposal as can be 
observed in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Pie charts showing the operating cost distribution for gas wells and oil wells 
(Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, March 2016). 
Water disposal is a major cost for some plays. It refers to the fluid that flows back 
to the surface after hydraulic fracturing and during the hydrocarbon extraction process. 
This flow-back fluid is a combination of fracking fluid and naturally occurring water that 
exists in the formation. The management of this flow-back water is a crucial point in the 
extraction process since the improper handling of these fluids poses a great risk to water 




The costs involved in the handling of flow-back water vary depending on the 
location of the shale play whose characteristics influence decisions such as reuse or 
recycling, as well as treatment and final disposal. In the United States most flow-back water 
is disposed through deep underground injection using Class II control wells.  The 
availability of adequate deep-well disposal capacity can be a limiting factor like in the case 
of the Marcellus Shale where approximately 77.5% is sent to treatment facilities to later be 
discharge to surface waters, 16% is reused, and a very small percentage is injected into 
deep wells (Gregory et al., 2011; Rozell and Reaven, 2012).  Flow-back disposal is very 
different in Texas where disposal wells are available.  At the low cost of 1 $/bbl, injection 
is the preferred method of flow-back water management despite the high water production 
rates (Rassenfoss, 2013; Nicot et al., 2014). Reuse of flow-back water for hydraulic 
fracturing operations is another viable option with costs in the range of 0.60-1.80 $/bbl 
depending on its chemical composition (Stewart, 2015). 
3.2.3. Financing costs 
 Financing costs are the expenses associated to securing financing for a project. 
Because oil and gas projects are capital-intensive, companies finance their operations either 
from equity financing or through borrowings and loans. The financing costs include interest 
payments and other costs paid to the providers of the funds. The other costs can include: 
amortization of discounts or premiums, finance charges applied to finance leases, and 
exchange differences from foreign currency borrowings (IFRS, 2012). 
 Each company has a financial structure used to raise capital, both debt and equity. 
Small companies are typically limited to their capital sources with only bank loans 




more options of securitized debt or venture capital (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). Although 
debt is cheaper, it is considered a burden and a risk; therefore, companies should try to 
raise equity to maintain an appropriate balance (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). Depending on 
the capital structure of the company, the adequate proportion of debt and equity is 
determined.  
 Another important aspect when discussing financing costs is the opportunity cost 
which is defined as “the potential benefit lost or sacrificed when the choice of one course 
of action requires giving up an alternative course of action” (Mian, 2002). Companies have 
a portfolio of projects and they must choose the best that will give them an attractive return 
on their investment. When performing the economic analysis through the discounted cash 
flow method, the opportunity cost must be taken into consideration and is reflected in the 
discount rate used for the evaluation. The discount rate is the risk-adjusted cost of capital 
for the specific project. A company creates value for their shareholders when it invests in 
projects that yield results above their cost of capital (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). Since 
companies usually use financing mechanisms to raise capital, they must choose a discount 
rate that is above their weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The WACC is the 
corporate hurdle, meaning the proportion of debt and equity, and depends on the capital 





Chapter 4: Impact of low oil prices 
 The sharp decline in oil prices is pushing companies to innovate, reduce costs, and 
evaluate strategies that can help them stay afloat while prices are low.   
 In this chapter, I discuss the impact of low oil prices on companies’ finances, 
operations, and some strategies that can be applied when there is uncertainty in prices.   
4.1. Impact on the finances  
 Companies require capital to sustain their operations which is raised through debt 
(acquiring loans or selling bonds), or through equity (selling stocks in the market). Since 
oil prices started declining in mid-2014, there has been an increased weakness among 
credits related to oil and gas exploration, production, and energy services. According to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, total loans for the oil and gas 
exploration and production sector were 276.5 billion dollars for the year 2015, of which 
34.2 billion dollars were classified as substandard, doubtful, or loss compared to 6.9 billion 
dollars in 2014 (FRB, 2015). This situation is reflected in the companies’ income 
statements. EOG Resources reported a net income loss of 4.5 billion dollars in the year 
2015 when the WTI price averaged at 48 $/bbl compared to a net income gain of 2.9 billion 
dollars in 2014 when the WTI price averaged at 85 $/bbl (EOG Resources, Feb. 2016). 
Pioneer Natural Resources and Chesapeake Energy reported a net income loss of 0.3 and 
14.9 billion dollars respectively in 2015 (Pioneer Natural Resources, Feb. 2016; 
Chesapeake Energy, Feb. 2016). When prices are low, companies become more capital-
constrained and may have to get capital at higher interest rates (Ikonnikova and Gülen, 




obligations which can be achieved through the sale of assets, CAPEX and OPEX reduction, 
debt acquisition, or equity reduction.  
 Companies respond to low prices by reducing expenses, mostly in these categories: 
number of employees (layoffs), exploration costs, drilling and completion costs, and non-
core businesses (assets sale). Companies including companies and oilfield services have 
announced and already reduced their workforce. Schlumberger eliminated about 20,000 
jobs worldwide in early 2015 and Baker Hughes plans to eliminate about 7,000 jobs in 
2016 (Karkela, Jan. 2016). Companies like EOG Resources and Pioneer Natural Resources 
have already decreased their workforce by 240 and 343 employees respectively (EOG 
Resources, Feb. 2016; Pioneer Natural Resources, Feb. 2016).  
 Companies use different strategies to minimize risk. One of them is hedging, which 
is an investment position intended to offset potential losses from fluctuations in prices by 
agreeing to set a future price for a product. Hedging is the use of financial instruments 
known as “derivatives” that are commonly used by companies to protect their cash flow. 
However, when the uncertainty in prices is high, hedging can be counterproductive in the 
case prices rise above the hedging price while a contract for said price is still in place. 
Additionally, companies are evaluating their assets to sell the ones that do not fit their 
strategy in this low price environment. For example, Pioneer Natural Resources has sold 
its Eagle Ford Shale midstream business to increase the company’s liquidity position 
(Pioneer Natural Resources, May 2016). International companies are also struggling with 
uncertainty in prices. Companies such as Petrobras and Pemex, are also considering selling 




4.2. Impact on the operations 
 In times of price uncertainty, companies are driven to adjust their production which 
translate into potential changes in capital budgets and input costs that result on changes in 
number of wells drilled and completed; the combination of water, proppant, and chemicals 
used for completion; and completion design (Ikonnikova and Gülen, 2015). Companies are 
also focusing on keeping production flowing from their existing wells and not trying to 
develop new areas if they do not have commitments to fulfill, forcing shale producers to 
delay new drilling and rely more in re-fracturing to keep production constant. Other 
companies are still drilling, but not completing new wells; therefore, an increase in the 
number of new wells does not necessarily translate to an increase in production (Allen, 
2016). For example, EOG Resources reported 300 drilled uncompleted wells at year-end 
2015; and they expect an oil production decline of 5% for the year 2016 (EOG Resources, 
Feb. 2016). The advantage of having drilled but uncompleted wells is that almost half of 
their cost is considered sunk by the time they start producing (Dunning, 2016). The 
decrease on the number of wells drilled in the United States is reflected in the decrease on 




the United States has decreased in 1,168 compared to the previous year (Baker Hughes, 
2016).  
Figure 4.1. U.S. onshore rig count 2011-2015 (Source: Baker Hughes, 2016). 
 As experience is gained in shale reservoirs, companies pick better drilling locations 
which improves wells’ productivity; and they also improve drilling and completion 
techniques which can reduce costs. Cost reduction is especially important when oil prices 
are low so new wells can be economically viable. Companies like EOG Resources and 
Pioneer Natural Resources are responding to this challenge by reducing their drilling time 
and completion costs which have an economic impact on service fees and well economics. 
Additionally, companies use infill drilling, which reduces the spacing between wells, in 
high-productivity areas to expand the inventory of wells and increase the field’s 
production. The new wells drilled through an infill drilling program are cheaper to 
complete because they use significantly less water and proppant than original wells; but 
the production from the individual infill wells is lower than original wells (Ikonnikova and 




higher estimated ultimate recovery from a given field which can possibly translate into 
higher return on capital on a per-lease basis (Ikonnikova and Gülen, 2015).  
 Additionally, for shale plays that have different hydrocarbon products, diversifying 
their portfolio of oil and gas wells can be helpful. For example, the Eagle Ford Shale, 
compared to other shale reservoirs that usually contain either oil or gas, contains large 
quantities of oil, natural gas liquids, and natural gas. This has being beneficial in the past 
for South Texas companies (principally producing shale gas) since, as explained in Chapter 
2, there is a disparity between oil and natural gas prices; thus, when oil prices are low, 
companies can switch to produce more gas if its price has not fallen as much (Tunstall, 





Chapter 5: Financial analysis 
 Many companies are struggling to keep operations afloat with oil prices below 50 
$/bbl, which is observed in their financial results measured through the financial ratios. 
Financial ratios are relationships between different categories of financial data (cash, net 
working capital, and net fixed assets) from a company used for comparison purposes 
(Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). They are classified as: liquidity measurement ratios, operating 
performance ratios, profitability ratios, debt ratios, and investment valuation ratios.  
 In this chapter, I give a brief description of each of the selected companies to later 
explain the results for some financial ratios that are the most relevant in comparing the 
selected companies in regards to debt, liquidity, and cash flow from their operating 
activities.  
 For the financial analysis, I collected data from the companies’ balance sheets, 
statements of income, statements of cash flows, and business summary which are compiled 
in the 10-K reports, as well as data from the annual report to shareholders. The 10-K report 
is an annual form required by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) that gives a comprehensive summary of a company’s financial performance. The 
study comprises data for a ten-year period (2005-2015) to understand the relationship 
between the oil price cycles and the companies’ financial performance. 
5.1. Selected companies 
 To carry out the financial, as well as the economic analysis, the selected companies 
must be publicly traded to obtain their financial data and investor presentations, which 




operations in the Eagle Ford Shale and operate their stimulated, horizontal wells with over 
twelve months of production data. 
5.1.1. EOG Resources 
 EOG Resources Inc. (EOG) is based in the United States.  It operates in the United 
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Trinidad, and China. In the United States, EOG has assets 
in the Eagle Ford, the location of most of its assets and in which the company is the largest 
crude oil producer. EOG also has assets in the Permian Basin (Leonard, Wolfcamp, and 
Second Bone Spring Sand plays), Barnett Shale, Marcellus Shale, the Anadarko Basin, the 
Rocky Mountains area, and the Upper Gulf Coast region. EOG is listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange and is traded under the ticker symbol "EOG". 
 According to EOG’s Annual Report 2015, the company leads in number of wells 
with peak production rates greater than 1,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day, which can 
be confirmed by looking at the production of some of their wells in databases like those 
from Drillinginfo. Additionally, EOG’s initiatives extends beyond drilling and completion 
technological advances; its in-house developers create proprietary analytical software 
suited to its particular needs as a company (EOG, Feb. 2016). 
 In 2015, EOG increased its combined domestic and international oil and condensate 
production by177.20 MBbld2 compared to the results from 2014, because of the production 
growth in domestic plays (Figure 5.1). However, its natural gas and natural gas liquids 
(NGLs) production suffered a small decline (Figure 5.2, and 5.3). EOG’s daily crude oil 
and condensate, natural gas, and natural gas liquids production from the United States only 
                                                 




are in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 respectively. Additionally, EOG’s net proved 
reserves declined by 471.72 MMBoe3 (Figure 5.7).  
 
Figure 5.1. EOG’s Crude oil and condensate daily production per location 2005-2015 










                                                 




Figure 5.2. EOG’s Natural gas daily production per location 2005-2015 (EOG, Feb. 
2016). 






Figure 5.4. EOG’s U.S. crude oil and condensate daily production 2005-2015 (EOG, 
Feb.2016). 







Figure 5.6. EOG’s U.S. natural gas liquids daily production 2005-2015 (EOG, Feb. 2016) 







5.1.2. Pioneer Natural Resources 
 Pioneer Natural Resources (Pioneer) is an exploration and production (E&P) 
company from the United States based in Texas. The company focuses its operations in the 
Spraberry/Wolfcamp in the Permian Basin and the Eagle Ford Shale, both in Texas. They 
are the largest producer in the Spraberry/Wolfcamp and a top operator in the Eagle Ford 
Shale. Additionally, Pioneer is a large natural gas producer in the West Panhandle gas field 
in Texas and in the coal bed methane-rich Raton Basin in southeastern Colorado. Before 
2010, the company operated in Argentina, Canada, South Africa, and Tunisia, as well as in 
the United States; but since 2011, Pioneer focused its efforts to develop domestic plays. 
Pioneer is listed in the New York Stock Exchange traded under the ticker symbol "PXD"; 
and has been the second best performing E&P stock in the S&P 500 over the past five years 
(Pioneer, Feb. 2016). 
 During 2015, Pioneer placed 197 horizontal wells on production, increasing its 
crude oil and condensate production by 15.75 MBbld (Figure 5.8) compared to 2014. 
However, Pioneer’s natural gas (Figure 5.9) and NGLs (Figure 5.10) production decreased 
by 16.60 MMscfd and 4.60 MBbld, respectively for the same period. Pioneer’s daily crude 
oil and condensate, natural gas, and NGLs production from the United States from 2005 to 
2015 are in Figure 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 respectively. Additionally, Pioneer’s net proved 










Figure 5.8. Pioneer’s crude oil and condensate daily production per location 2005-2015 


















Figure 5.9. Pioneer’s Natural gas daily production per location 2005-2015 (Pioneer, Feb. 
2016). 
Figure 5.10. Pioneer’s Natural gas liquids daily production per location 2005-2015 





Figure 5.11. Pioneer’s U.S. crude oil and condensate daily production 2005-2015 
(Pioneer, Feb.2016). 







Figure 5.13. Pioneer’s U.S. natural gas liquids daily production 2005-2015 (Pioneer, Feb. 
2016) 





5.1.3. Chesapeake Energy 
 Chesapeake Energy (Chesapeake) is based in Oklahoma. Chesapeake operates in 
the Utica, Marcellus and Niobrara Shales on the north of the country, and on the Eagle 
Ford, Anadarko Basin, Haynesville, and Barnett Shale on the south. Chesapeake is listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange and is traded under the ticker symbol "CHK". 
 In 2015, Chesapeake’s crude oil and condensate production decreased in 13.70 
MBbld (Figure 5.15), and its natural gas production decreased in 68.49 MMscfd (Figure 
5.16). Additionally, Chesapeake’s net proved reserves declined by 991.90 MMBoe (Figure 
5.17). 









Figure 5.16. Chesapeake’s U.S. natural gas daily production 2005-2015 (Chesapeake, 
Feb. 2016). 





5.2. Financial ratios results 
 Cash ratio 
 The cash ratio is an indicator of a company's liquidity. It measures the amount of 
cash, cash equivalents or invested funds in current assets to cover current liabilities. This 
ratio only takes into account the most liquid short-term assets of the company, which are 
those that can be easily converted to cash to pay off current obligations; thus, it ignores 
inventory and receivables, as there are no assurances that these can be converted to cash in 
a timely matter to meet current liabilities. Very few companies have enough cash to cover 
their current liabilities; hence, it is not necessarily bad for a company to have a cash ratio 
under 100%. The equation for the cash ratio is: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
    [5.1] 
  
 The results for the cash ratio in Figure 5.18 show that throughout the 2005 and 2015 
period there is no trend present for any of the three companies. However, Chesapeake’s 
cash ratio is low for the majority of years, meaning that its liabilities greatly exceed its 
cash, cash equivalents, and invested funds in current assets that can be used to pay said 
liabilities. For 2015, Pioneer’s cash ratio is 95%, which is a sign of financial strength, 
meaning that for that year, the company can pay most of its current liabilities with the 









Figure 5.18. Cash ratio showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Cash-flow-to-debt ratio 
 A variation to the cash ratio is the cash-flow-to-debt ratio that is a measure of a 
company’s ability to meet its total debt (or total liabilities) with its yearly cash flow from 
operations. The greater the ratio, the greater the company’s ability to carry its total debt. It 
is defined by the equation: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
     [5.2] 
  
 The results for the cash-flow-to-debt ratio show that EOG and Chesapeake have 
higher debt loads than their operating cash flows; and, on the contrary, Pioneer produces 
enough yearly cash flow from their operations to cover their liabilities in most years (Figure 
5.19). Pioneer’s performance is a sign of financial strength since it has outstanding results 




environment of 2015, its ratio was 85% which still shows financial strength. EOG has a 
moderate performance throughout the 2005-2008 period; but since the crisis of 2008, its 
cash-flow-to-debt ratio has declined Chesapeake’s results show a weak cash flow 
generation and too much debt.  
 
                   Values for Chesapeake from 2005 to 2009 were not found. 
Figure 5.19. Cash-flow-to-debt ratio showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Operating profit margin 
 This profitability ratio represents how many cents are earned for each dollar of 
sales. It does not take into account selling, general and administrative, or operating 
expenses. Positive and negative trends in this ratio are, for the most part, directly 
attributable to management decisions since operators have control over these expenses. 
The operating profit margin ratio shows whether the fixed costs are too high for the 




operating margin is increasing, the company is earning more money per dollar of sales. 
The equation for the operating profit margin is: 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
     [5.3] 
 The operating profit margin for each company is in Figure 5.20. The results seem 
to follow the oil price trend; but they are not necessarily correlated. Even though oil prices 
determine in great part profit margin for oil companies, the operating profit margin is 
mainly determined by costs. This ratio measures how much revenue is left over after 
deducting operating expenses. Under the low oil price environment of 2015, the three 
companies show loses from their operating activities which is expected taking into account 
the breakeven analysis in Chapter 7. Chesapeake is the one with the largest loss per dollar 
of sales, which is also consistent with the analysis in Chapter 7. A low operating profit 
margin usually means that a company has a high financial risk, since it implies that the 








Figure 5.20. Operating profit margin showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Net profit margin 
 A variation on the operating profit margin is the net profit margin. This profitability 
ratio calculates the percentage of income that remains after all operating expenses, interest, 
taxes, and preferred stock dividends have been subtracted from the total revenue. The 
equation for the operating profit margin is: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
     [5.4] 
  
 The net profit margin results for each company is in Figure 5.21 and resembles the 









Figure 5.21. Net profit margin 2005-2015. 
 Debt ratio 
 The debt ratio measures the amount of debt a company has on its balance sheets 
compared to its assets. This ratio is helpful when analyzing a company’s leverage. The 
higher the ratio, the more debt compared to assets and the more leveraged it is which can 
be considered riskier. A downside to this ratio is that it is not a pure measurement of debt 
as it also includes operational liabilities, such as accounts payable and taxes payable; 
therefore, it is analyzed along with other ratios for comparison purposes. The equation for 










 Figure 5.22 shows that EOG and Chesapeake have high debt ratios, and Pioneer 
has a low debt ratio. These results are consistent with the previously discussed cash-flow-
to-debt ratio. When analyzing both ratios together, it can be concluded that Pioneer has a 
smaller debt load, which can be greatly covered by the cash produced from its operations. 
In contrast, EOG and Chesapeake have a larger debt load compared to their operating cash 
flows, which can be interpreted by investors as being riskier companies that struggle to 
meet their obligations.   
 
Figure 5.22. Debt ratio showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Debt-equity ratio 
 The debt-equity ratio provides a general indication of a company’s relationship 
between equity and liabilities. This ratio can be used when evaluating a company that is 
applying for a loan. However, it is necessary to understand the industry in which the 
company operates. Oil and gas companies are capital intensive; and it is common to have 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
    [5.6] 
 
 The results in Figure 5.23 show that EOG and Chesapeake have debt-equity ratios 
close to or over 100% for the 2005-2015 period. However, for 2015, Chesapeake’s debt-
equity ratio was 700%, which indicates that the company has been heavily taking on debt. 
A ratio this high is risky for the company because if the cost of the debt outweighs its 
return, it can lead to bankruptcy. Pioneer, on the other hand, has very low debt-equity ratios 
for the same period indicating that it has taken on little debt. 
 
Figure 5.23. Debt-equity ratio showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Capitalization ratio 
 A company's capitalization is the term used to describe the capital structure of a 
company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of both long-term debt and 
shareholders' equity. This ratio indicates to what extent the company is using its equity to 




in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness. A company considered 
too highly leveraged (too much debt) may find its options to rise capital restricted by its 




𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
   [5.7] 
 
 There is not an established appropriate capitalization ratio; it depends on the 
company’s structure. Figure 5.24 shows that from 2005 to 2014, Pioneer and Chesapeake 
have a capitalization ratio below or close to 50%, which is moderate in the industry. 
However, the results for 2015 show that Chesapeake has a capitalization ratio of 83% 
which can make the company look at risk of insolvency if it fails to pay its debts on time. 
EOG has the lowest capitalization ratio among the three companies for most years during 
the observed period which is considered good and a sign of financial fitness as its capital 










Figure 5.24. Capitalization ratio showing WTI Price 2005-2015. 
 Other information commonly used to complement financial data are net proved 
reserves and net undeveloped acres. Net proved reserves are important because by 
definition they are only considered as such if they can be extracted with existing technology 
and under existing operating conditions (most importantly price); consequently, they 
change. Net undeveloped acres is another important factor to consider when analyzing 
companies because the amount of acres available to drill directly affects operations and 
production. I included these two factors in the analysis plotting them against WTI price 
and price per share data (Figure 5.25 and 5.26) extracted from the MarketWatch website 










Figure 5.25. Net proved reserves of oil and NGLs vs. price per share vs. WTI price 2005-
2015. 





 From the financial ratios analysis, Pioneer is the company with the best results; its 
high cash-flow-to-debt ratio, and low debt and debt-to-equity ratios make it an attractive 
company to invest in. In contrast, Chesapeake has the worst results which represents high 
risk for investors. The results from the companies’ financial performance is reflected in 
their per share price. Pioneer’s shares are valued higher than for EOG or Chesapeake; and 
Chesapeake’s is valued the lowest. However, the oil price decline that started in 2014 has 
taken a hit to the oil and gas industry which is reflected in the negative profitability ratios 
at year-end 2015 for the three companies analyzed in this study (Appendix), and that are 
repeated for other companies across the industry.  
 Financial ratios are useful indicators of a company’s operative performance and 
financial situation, as well as to analyze trends and compare companies in the same 
industry. Although they cannot be used to make certain predictions on a company’s future 
and position within the industry, they provide a good notion of the areas a company needs 
to improve on, which is important for investors. Additionally, although Figure 5.25 and 
5.26 do not show a relationship between net proved reserves or net undeveloped acres and 





Chapter 6: Production model 
 Production forecasting is a crucial part of analyzing the economics of a drilling 
project or a single well. Production volumes will determine, in great part, the economic 
feasibility of drilling a new well because if production falls below a certain rate, the cost 
to extract the hydrocarbon is more than the income received from its production.  
 In this chapter, I evaluate two different methods to develop a production model and 
estimate future production for wells in the Eagle Ford Shale. I selected the Eagle Ford 
because it is the largest oil and gas development in the world based on capital invested 
(Eagle Ford Shale, Feb. 2016), and it is the second largest oil producer in the United States, 
after the Permian basin, as of March 2016 (U.S. EIA, Mar. 7, 2016).  This perspective is 
important given the current low oil and gas prices since companies will focus on what they 
think are the most profitable plays. 
6.1. Eagle Ford Shale 
 The Eagle Ford Shale, located in South-Central Texas, consists of Cretaceous 
sediments with an average thickness of 250 feet that extends 50 miles wide and 400 miles 
long covering 30 counties (Figure 6.1) (Eagle Ford Shale, 2016; U.S. EIA, May 2010; 
TRRC, Feb. 2016). This low permeability reservoir has a large carbonate content, which 
makes it relatively brittle and thus easier to stimulate through hydraulic fracturing than 
other plays. The importance of this shale play is its capability to produce large volumes of 
oil as well as natural gas. The hydrocarbons produced from the Eagle Ford range from dry 
gas to gas condensate to volatile oil to black oil.  The well production and quality vary 
widely across the play. The average estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) for the Eagle Ford 
is 168,000 barrels per well which varies from county to county and from well to well 




 The proved reserves for the Eagle Ford at year-end 2014 were 5.2 billion barrels of 
oil, and 23.7 trillion standard cubic feet (Tscf) of natural gas (U.S. EIA, Nov. 23, 2015). 
These reserve estimates account for 30% and 16% of the total U.S. tight oil and shale gas 
reserves for 2014. 
 Production from the Eagle Ford has been increasing rapidly; but has seen a 
deceleration in 2015 (Figure 6.3) as a result of the low oil and gas prices. The average 
production for the year-end 2015 is 1.1 million barrels per day of oil, 5.4 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas, and 0.3 million barrels per day of condensate (TRRC, Feb. 2016). 
 
Figure 6.1. Eagle Ford map showing the different petroleum and gas windows (Source: 






County Average EUR (bbls/well) 
Eagle Ford Shale 168,000 









Table 6.1. Average EUR in Eagle Ford counties from wells drilled between 2008 and 
2013 (Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). 
Figure 6.2. Distribution of EUR in thousand bbls per well in the Eagle Ford (Source: U.S. 






Figure 6.3. Eagle Ford oil production 2008-2015 (Source: Railroad Commission of 
Texas, February 2016). 
 Even though the Eagle Ford has experienced a decrease of 59% in drilling permits 
issued, from 5,613 in 2014 to 2,315 in 2015 (TRRC, Feb. 2016), it still has a substantial 
number of drilling rigs operating compared to other basins, which is an indication that 
companies will continue their operations in this play. By year-end 2015, the Eagle Ford 


















Figure 6.4. Pie chart for drilling rig count in the United States and percentage per basin at 
year-end 2015 (Source: Baker Hughes, 2016).  
 The challenge of selecting the Eagle Ford Shale for the analysis is mainly because 
of the short life of the play. The Eagle Ford started its play-wide development in 2008 
when the first horizontal well was drilled, and it has been in continuous development since 
then. However, there is not long-term production performance to fully understand the 
decline characteristics in this play. Moreover, it also presents technical challenges when 
forecasting production given its low permeability and the complex fracture network 
resulting from multistage fracture treatments (Gong, 2013). For this reasons, the selection 
of the adequate decline curve analysis model is essential to create a reliable production 
model.  
6.2. Decline curve analysis models 
 The volume of hydrocarbons that can be produced from a reservoir can be estimated 
by using production decline curve analysis, which is a traditional method for the prediction 




of well performance and life based on historical production data. The concept of decline 
curve analysis involves fitting a trend line through a well’s historical production and 
extrapolating that line to estimate future production under the assumption that the past trend 
will not change under constant operational conditions (Arps, 1945).  
 The objective is to determine the estimated cumulative production, the project life, 
as well as production rates over the life of a well. It is known that production rate declines 
over time as cumulative production increases. Production will be terminated when the rate 
reaches its economic limit which is when the current income from operations equals the 
cost of production. The estimated cumulative production from before production starts 
until its economic limit is known as estimated ultimate recovery or EUR. As hydrocarbons 
are produced, the sum of the accumulated production from a well and its remaining reserves 
are equal to the EUR (Apiwatcharoenkul, 2014).   
 Many of the existing decline curve analysis models are based on empirical 
equations developed by Arps in 1945, which is still one of the preferred methods to estimate 
production. Arps proposed that when plotting production rate versus time, the curve 
generated can be expressed mathematically by the hyperbolic family of equations 
(Bahadori, 2012). This model was developed to analyze trends in conventional reservoirs; 
but unconventional reservoirs such as the Eagle Ford Shale are dominated by different 
characteristics, frequently resulting in an erroneous estimation of EUR compared to the 
actual cumulative production at the end of a well’s life. 
 Given the current importance of unconventional reservoirs, which have boosted 
hydrocarbons reserves particularly in the United States, new approaches to the existing 
method along with new models have been developed to specifically forecast production 




Exponential (PLE) by Ilk et al. 2008, Stretched Exponential Decline (SEPD) by Valko 
2009 and Valko and Lee 2010, Duong Method by Duong 2011, and Logistic Growth model 
by Clark et al. 2011. 
 The present study analyzes the main differences between only two of the mentioned 
models based on the data necessary and available for each: Arps Decline Curve model and 
Logistic Growth model to determine the most appropriate that will later be used for the 
production model.  
6.2.1. Arps decline curve model 
 Arps developed a mathematical model for three types of production decline curves: 
exponential, hyperbolic, and harmonic, which are observed in traditional reservoirs of 
different qualities. The Arps’ model is based on the concept of loss-ratio and its derivative 
expressed as follows (Kanfar and Wattenbarger, 2012): 
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 Where: 
D = decline constant 
b = hyperbolic exponent 




 Production from shale reservoirs follow a hyperbolic decline curve which is 
characterized by extremely high initial production rates, followed by a rapid decline. This 
type of reservoirs are commonly analyzed using Arps’ hyperbolic decline equation: 
 
𝑞 = 𝑞𝑖(1 + 𝑏𝐷𝑖𝑡)
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1−𝑏 − 𝑞1−𝑏)       [6.4] 
  Where: 
q = production rate at time t 
qi = initial rate 
Di = initial decline constant 
b = hyperbolic exponent 
Np = cumulative production at time t 
 In Arps’ hyperbolic decline equation, b should take values between 0 and 1. 
However, when fitting data using this equation for low permeability reservoirs, b often 
takes values greater than 1. As mentioned, this method was developed to analyze trends in 
conventional reservoirs with boundary-dominated flow regimes; however, unconventional 
reservoirs like low permeability shales are dominated by long transient flow regimes 
(Delaihdem, 2013). This behavior results in a cumulative production that does not reach 






6.2.2. Logistic growth model 
 Logistic growth models are based on the concept that growth is possible only to a 
maximum size referred as carrying capacity at which point the growth stabilizes. The 
model was adapted for single wells in tight permeability reservoirs by Clark et al. (2011) 
from the work by Tsoularis and Wallace (2002) who used it to model biological systems. 
The adapted model uses a growth equation which represents cumulative oil or gas 
production.  
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 Where: 
Np = cumulative production  
K = carrying capacity 
a = constant 
n = hyperbolic exponent 
t = time period 





       [6.6] 
 Where: 
q = production rate 
 In the equations above the carrying capacity K is the amount of recoverable oil or 




production. The hyperbolic exponent n has the same function as b in Arps’ equation as it 
controls the steepness of the decline. When n takes smaller values, the well will decline at 
a high rate for a short period of time before stabilizing; when n takes larger values the well 
will display a more gradual decline. If n>1, the model will have an inflection point where 
the rate increases for a short period of time before decreasing (Clark et al., 2011). The 
constant a is the time to the power n at which half of the carrying capacity has been 
produced. The larger the a value, the more stable the production will be during the life of 
the well (Clark et al., 2011). 
 In the Logistic Growth equation, the hyperbolic exponent n and the constant a are 
unknown. The parameter K can be obtained from volumetric calculations and will constrain 
the cumulative production (Clark et al., 2011). If K is known, the n and a parameters are 
obtained using least squares regression in Excel combined with the Solver add-in (Clark et 
al., 2011) by minimizing the sum of the difference between the squared historical data and 
squared estimated production. This initial estimated production needs preliminary n and a 
parameters which are later solved and replaced for the appropriate values with the Solver 
add-in. If K is unknown, it can also be solved using the least squares regression in Excel 
combined with the Solver add-in; but an initial estimation is still needed. The initial 
estimated value for K can be obtained from studies done in the area. 
6.3. Method selection 
 The selection of the appropriate method to estimate production for a typical well is 
essential for the production and discounted cash flow model and analysis. The production 
model using the selected method is to estimate oil production only, given that this study is 




 Based on the relatively short production history of the Eagle Ford, the Arps’ model 
does not allow for an accurate estimation of future production. Information available for 
the Eagle Ford includes the historical production from horizontal wells drilled as well as 
the average EUR of the play as a whole and also per county. The Logistic Growth Model 
equations use the EUR as the carrying capacity which serves as the maximum cumulative 
production that a well can reach. Having the EUR information from studies or the 
companies themselves facilitates production forecast when using the Logistic Growth 
Model and solves the problem of over estimation of reserves during the life of a well 
(Figure 6.5). 
 Figure 6.5. Method comparison between Arps and Logistic Growth. 
 Given the available information for the Eagle Ford Shale and the analysis 
performed between Arps and Logistic Growth methods, I decided to use the Logistic 
Growth for the production model as it is specifically developed for unconventional 




production), and it gives a conservative answer when performing the discounted cash flow 
analysis. 
6.4. Data preparation 
 I analyzed Eagle Ford historical production data from the Drillinginfo database by 
plotting monthly production against time. This facilitated the identification of wells that 
presented a reasonable hyperbolic decline curve to be considered for selection since not all 
profiles follow a smooth decline trend most likely because of well stimulation and re-
fracturing. This criterion helps in the calculation of the n and a parameters when 
performing the least squares regression. Twenty wells were selected for each company that 
I analyze (see Chapter 7) with the following criteria: 
 Reasonably smooth hyperbolic decline curve 
 >12 months of production data 
 Classified as oil wells 
 Horizontal wells 
 Drilled between 2008-2014 
 The majority of the selected wells produce gas along with the oil; and therefore, it 
is also included in the analysis. The gas forecast was estimated using the gas-oil ratio 
(GOR) from the historical data, not using the Logistic Growth method since there is not 
available EUR information for the gas that can be produced from oil wells. I plotted the 
GOR against time and determined the trend line to find a constant factor to multiply by the 
oil rate to provide a gas production estimate. The assumption for this approach is that 
production conditions will be constant during the life of the well and that the amount of 




 The production model for each company was developed for a typical well, which 
is the average of the selected existing wells per company. Months with a production value 
of zero were omitted when averaging the productions since they are because of temporary 
closure of the well. Averaging the production from the selected wells and omitting zero 
values smooths the production curve; however, it was not possible to get a completely 
smooth curve in all the cases.  
 The production model accuracy depends on the amount of production history 
available; for this reason, the wells selected for the model are those that have over twelve 
months of production at the time that the data were collected. Some important companies 
in the Eagle Ford did not meet this criterion, and therefore, were not included in the 
analysis. 
6.5. Production forecast 
 The necessary information for the production forecast using the Logistic Growth 
model is historical production data and the EUR to use as the parameter K. The historical 
production data were obtained from the Drillinginfo database. The EUR was obtained 
either from the company’s investor presentation or from the Annual Energy Outlook 
(AEO) 2014 prepared by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. However, it is also 
possible to solve for K to get the EUR. I compared the forecast results of each method to 
analyze the variation between using the given EUR and the obtained K. 
 To facilitate the analysis, the assumption is that the well will decline naturally 
without applying methods to increase production rate at a certain point. Additionally, the 
production forecast was terminated when the well becomes a “stripper well” at a production 
rate of 300 barrels per month. At this point the well becomes marginal and is reaching the 




of production (Delaihdem, 2013). In reality, companies use enhanced oil recovery methods 
to extend the economic life of a well. 
6.5.1. Production model 1: EOG Resources 
 For EOG Resources, the parameter K equal to 450,000 barrels of oil per well was 
obtained from the company’s investor presentation (May 2015). The selected wells’ 
location is in Figure 6.6. 
 Inputs: 
K = 450,000 bbls/well 
Production = Average monthly production from 20 wells with 36 months of historical data 
Figure 6.6. Map showing the selected EOG wells (Source: Drillinginfo, 2016) 
 The results for the oil forecast (per Equations 6.5 and 6.6) are as follows: 
n   = 1.05 
a   = 25.90 
Np = 398,826 bbls of oil 
 In this case, n is larger than 1. This does not mean the forecast is erroneous; it can 
be used to match data for wells whose initial rate is not their peak rate (Clark et al., 2011), 




 The EOG typical well becomes a stripper well in the 158th month after production 
starts; therefore production was terminated at this point reaching a cumulative production 
of 398,826 barrels of oil during its economic life as can be observed in Figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7. Oil production forecast from EOG’s data using the Logistic growth model. 
 The estimated gas rate was obtained using the results from the oil production 
forecast multiplied by a constant value of 1.39, which is the GOR on the last month of 












Figure 6.8. Gas production forecast from EOG’s data. 
 When solving for K, the resulting value is 552,047 barrels of oil which is greater 
than the EUR for an average well given on the company’s investor presentation; thus, 
cumulative production (Np) increases by 70,527 barrels and the life of the well is extended 
in 60 months (Figure 6.9). The cumulative production differs from K because production 
was terminated at 300 barrels per month for the reasons previously explained. Because of 
the increase in production, it is assumed that gas production also increases from the 
previously stated assumption that gas produced is directly proportional to the amount of 
oil produced. The variation in cumulative production during the life of the well is 
significant and can have important implications in the well economics; therefore, the 







  K known K unknown 
K (EUR) 450,000 bbls 552,047 bbls 
n 1.05 0.93 
a 25.90 26.37 
Np 398,826 bbls 469,346 bbls 
Figure 6.9. Oil production forecast for EOG from two different methods: K as a known 
parameter (given EUR from investor presentations) and K as an unknown 
parameter (solved simultaneously with n and a to provide the best model 
curve fit to the data using Equations (6.5) and (6.6)). 
6.5.2. Production model 2: Pioneer Natural Resources 
 In Pioneer Natural Resources’ case, the parameter K equal to 168,000 barrels of oil 
per well was obtained from EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014 since this information was 




Ford Shale since the selected wells are located in different counties. The selected wells’ 
location is in Figure 6.10. 
Figure 6.10. Map showing the selected Pioneer wells (Source: Drillinginfo, 2016) 
 Inputs for the model: 
K = 168,000 bbls/well 
Production = Average monthly production from 20 wells with 18 months of historical 
production 
 The results for the oil forecast (per Equations 6.5 and 6.6) are as follows: 
n   = 1.12 
a   = 10.59 
Np = 150,776 bbls of oil 
The typical Pioneer well becomes a stripper well in the 57th month after production starts; 
therefore production was terminated at this point reaching a cumulative production of 





Figure 6.11. Oil production forecast from Pioneer’s data using the Logistic growth 
model. 
 The estimated gas rate was obtained using the results from the oil production 
forecast multiplied by a constant value of 3.00, which is the average GOR on the last month 













Figure 6.12. Gas production forecast from Pioneer’s data. 
 When solving for K, the resulting value is 151,409 barrels of oil which is smaller 
than the average EUR for Eagle Ford from the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014; 
consequently, cumulative production (Np) decreases in 11,674 barrels and the life of the 
well is reduced in 10 months (Figure 6.13). The cumulative production differs from K 
because of the reasons previously explained. Because of the decrease in production, it is 
anticipated for gas production to decrease too. The variation in cumulative production 
during the life of the well could be significant when analyzing the well economics; 










  K known K unknown 
K (EUR) 168,000 bbls 151,409 bbls 
n 1.12 1.25 
a 10.59 10.84 
Np 150.776 bbls 139,102 bbls 
Figure 6.13. Oil production forecast for Pioneer from two different methods: K as a 
known parameter (given EUR from EIA AEO 2014) and K as an unknown 
parameter (solved simultaneously with n and a to provide the best model 
curve fit to the data using Equations (6.5) and (6.6)). 
6.5.3. Production model 3: Chesapeake Energy 
 For Chesapeake Energy, the parameter K equal to 168,000 barrels of oil per well 
was obtained from EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014 since this information was not in 
the company’s investor presentation. I used the average EUR for the Eagle Ford Shale since 





Figure 6.14. Map showing the selected Chesapeake wells (Source: Drillinginfo, 2016) 
 Inputs: 
K = 168,000 bbls/well 
Production = Average monthly production from 20 wells with 13 months of historical 
production The results for the oil forecast (per Equations 6.5 and 6.6) are as follows: 
n   = 1.22 
a   = 15.10 
Np = 151,906 bbls of oil 
 In this case, n is larger than 1; but as explained previously, this can be used to match 
data for wells whose initial rate is not their peak rate which is the case for the majority of 
the wells used in the analysis. 
 The Chesapeake typical well becomes a stripper well in the 59th month after 




production of 151,906 barrels of oil during its economic life as can be observed in Figure 
6.15. 
Figure 6.15. Oil production forecast from Chesapeake’s data using the Logistic growth 
model. 
 The estimated gas rate was obtained using the results from the oil production 
forecast multiplied by a constant value of 0.90, which is the GOR on the last month of 











Figure 6.16. Gas production forecast from Chesapeake’s data. 
 When solving for K, the resulting value is 154,153 barrels of oil which is smaller 
than the average EUR from the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014; consequently, 
cumulative production (Np) decreases in 10,817 barrels and the life of the well is reduced 
in 8 months (Figure 6.17). The cumulative production differs from K because of the reasons 
previously explained. Because of the decrease in production, it is anticipated for gas 
production to decrease too. The variation in cumulative production during the life of the 
well, even though does not seem as large in contrast to the other companies in the study, 
could be significant when analyzing the well economics; therefore, the variation in 








  K known K unknown 
K (EUR) 168,000 bbls 154,153 bbls 
n 1.22 1.29 
a 15.10 14.83 
Np 151,906 bbls 141,089 bbls 
Figure 6.17. Oil production forecast for Chesapeake from two different methods: K as a 
known parameter (given EUR from EIA AEO 2014) and K as an unknown 
parameter (solved simultaneously with n and a to provide the best model 





Chapter 7: Well economics 
 Drilling a new well or a group of wells is a business decision, and as such, an 
appraisal and in-depth analysis of the investment opportunity is needed. The discounted 
cash flow (DCF) analysis is a widely accepted valuation method to estimate the economic 
feasibility or attractiveness of an investment opportunity by taking into account the time 
value of money.  
 In this chapter, I use the DCF approach as a method of economic valuation to 
determine the economic feasibility of drilling a typical well for the production of oil and 
gas for three companies in the Eagle Ford Shale by using production and costs estimates, 
as well as royalty, taxes, and price assumptions.  
 Additionally, a sensitivity analysis was developed for each company. This is a 
technique that indicates how much the profitability of drilling a well will change in 
response to changes in an input variable while others are held constant.  
7.1. Discounted cash flow (DCF) model 
 Future and past values of money can be converted into their present value 
equivalent or Net Present Value (NPV) which is critical when assessing the profitability of 
long-term investments especially when ranking projects and economic resources are 
limited (Mian, 2002).  
 The DCF analysis uses projections for future cash flows and discounts them to the 
present. The purpose of determining the present value of future cash flows relies on the 
premise that a dollar invested today is worth more than a dollar payable in the future 
because of the risk of not receiving revenue from that investment (Knull et al., 2007). The 
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 Where: 
CF = cash flow at time t 
i = discount rate 
n = number of periods 
 If the NPV is positive, it means that the expected revenues are greater than what 
could be gained by earning the discount rate in other options. If the NPV is equal to zero, 
it means that there is neither gain nor loss. If the NPV is negative, it means that the project 
is expected to lose money.  
 The key component of the equation is the discount rate i defined as the “risk 
adjusted cost of capital” (Inkpen & Moffett, 2011). The discount rate used changes with 
each company; but, it has to be one that yields above the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) (Inkpen & Moffett, 2011) which depends on the company’s capital structure. For 
analysis purposes, the DCF model developed uses the same discount rate for the three 
companies. 
 Additional to the discount rate i, the NPV is determined by the cash flow for each 
period during the life of the project. The cash flow that considers only costs, royalty, and 
severance tax is called cash flow before tax (CFBFIT) and yields the NPVBFIT. The cash flow 
that considers depletion allowance and federal income tax is called cash flow after tax 
(CFAFIT) and yields the NPVAFIT. The depletion allowance for the model was calculated 
using the cost depletion method. 






[𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑠] − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 − [𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑠] ∗
𝑆𝑒𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥      [7.2] 
 Where: 
Gross oil = Total oil produced (Bbls) 
Gross gas = Total gas produced (Mscf) 
Royalty = Fraction of the oil paid to the lessor of the land 
Price of oil = Estimated selling price of oil ($/bbl) 
Price of oil = Estimated selling price of gas ($/Mscf) 
Capex = Capital expenditures ($) 
Opex = Operating expenditures in $/boe, where 1 Mscf of gas is equivalent to 1/5.8 bbls 
of oil 
Net oil = Gross oil minus royalty 
Net gas = Gross gas minus royalty 
 The cash flow after federal income tax (AFIT) for each year in the DCF model is 
calculated as: 
 
𝐶𝐹 𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑇 − [(𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑇 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 
𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥]       [7.3] 
 Where: 
Federal Income Tax = Corporate tax imposed on net taxable income 
Depletion Allowance = Tax reduction for the recovery of capital investments 
 The depletion allowance used in the model is the Cost Depletion method, calculated 





𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛       [7.4] 
  
Where: 
Cumulative Production = Estimated total production of oil and gas during the life of the 
well (boe)4 
Net production = Net production of oil and gas produced in the year (boe) 
7.1.1. General inputs and assumptions 
 The accuracy of the model depends on the accuracy of the assumptions and inputs 
which frequently are uncertain; therefore, two types of models were developed as part of 
the analysis to account for this uncertainty. The two types of models developed for each 
company are: a deterministic or base case model, and a probabilistic model.  
 A deterministic model is fully determined by the initial parameter values; it is a 
static model that yields only one possible result and is the reason why it is used as the base 
case model. A probabilistic model assumes an inherent randomness to the model inputs to 
account for a possible under-appreciation of the complexity and risks associated to drilling 
a well.  
 The DCF base case model is based on production, revenues, costs, royalty, and 
taxes projections. The production projection for each company is explained in Chapter 6; 
the others are explained below: 
 Costs 
 The main components are operating expense (OPEX) and capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), in which the latter is formed by drilling and completion. OPEX and CAPEX 
were obtained from the company’s 10-K reports or investor’s presentations. If the 
                                                 




information was not available in these documents, the values used were obtained from 
similar studies done in similar shale plays and by consulting with industry specialists. 
Additionally, another important cost is abandonment, this information was not specified in 
the operators’ documents consulted; thus, the input value used was obtained from similar 
studies in Texas shale plays. 
 Royalty 
 A stipulated fraction of the oil and gas produced is paid to the lessor of the land 
either in kind or its equivalent in money. In Texas, royalties are usually negotiable, and 
therefore vary by lease. The base royalty used in the model is 25% which is commonly 
used by industry specialists when evaluating projects in the Eagle Ford (TRRC, Feb. 2016). 
 Taxes 
 Although Texas does not levy a property tax on the value of oil and gas property or 
a state federal income tax, it collects tax revenues via a severance tax. In addition, 
companies also pay federal income tax. 
 Severance tax: The baseline for Texas is 4.6% on the market value of oil and 
condensate produced, and 7.5% on the market value of gas produced. Since the model is 
for wells classified as “oil wells”, the severance tax used is 4.6% which applies to the oil 
and gas produced (gas treated as oil equivalent in boe). The 7.5% severance tax on gas 
production is omitted from the analysis principally from the wells classification, but also 
from the many tax exemptions Texas offers for high cost gas wells (Gülen et al., 2013). 
 Federal income tax: The federal income tax used in the model is 35%. This is a 
corporate tax imposed on the net taxable income (gross income less allowable tax 
deductions). Some allowable tax deductions include depletion, depreciation, and 




model developed includes a cost depletion calculation to allow for a fair comparison 
between the companies comprised in the present study.  
 Revenues 
 The revenues will be dependent of the net production and market price of oil and 
gas. The base market price used for the model is 40 $/bbl and 2.28 $/Mscf, for oil and gas 
respectively. 
The DCF probabilistic model is based on the values used in the base case model, 
but the uncertainty factor is introduced into the equation by setting probabilistic 
distributions for some of the inputs: 
 Costs 
 Drilling, completion, abandonment, and OPEX were modeled using the Triangular 
distribution under the assumption that they can take values under and over 20% of the 
baseline value.  
 Royalty 
 It was modeled using the Triangular distribution assuming it can vary 20% from 
the baseline value. 
 Production 
 It was modeled using the Lognormal distribution for the initial production 
(production of the first year). The mean and standard deviation parameters were calculated 
from the historical initial production from the selected wells for each company. 
 Price 
 Oil and natural gas real prices between the years 2000 and 2015 (in 2015 dollars) 
were analyzed to determine the best distribution that fitted the data which results can be 




Triangular distribution, for oil and gas respectively. Additionally, prices were truncated at 
15 $/bbl and 1 $/Mscf, for oil and gas respectively based on historical data prior to the year 
2000. 
Figure 7.1. Results for the distribution fitting analysis for oil prices (Source: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2015; Inflation Data, 2015). 
Figure 7.2.  Results for the distribution fitting analysis for natural gas prices (Source: 






 The model was developed under the following assumptions that apply to all 
companies: 
 
Assumption Value Description 
Working 
interest (WI) 
100  % The company is responsible for all the costs incurred 
in the drilling, completion, production and 
abandonment of the well. 
Discount rate 10  % Commonly used in the industry to evaluate projects. 
Economic limit 300 Bbls/month Wells reaching the end of its economic life. 
Royalty 25 % Royalty for the Eagle ford between 22-28%. 
Oil price 40 $/bbl Flat during the life of the well. 
Gas price 2.28 $/Mscf Flat during the life of the well. 
Table 7.1. Assumptions used in the DCF base case model for all companies. 
7.2. Model description and results 
 The base case model was developed in Excel using the production projection results 
assuming a known carrying capacity K. However, a DCF model was also developed for the 
results when assuming an unknown K to analyze the variations between the two approaches 
and accuracy of the production inputs. The probabilistic model, sensitivity analysis, and 
distribution fitting was developed using @Risk Student Version software. The software 
uses probabilistic distributions that are set for the variables resulting in an ensemble of 
different outputs.  
7.2.1. DCF model 1: EOG Resources 
7.2.1.1. Base case model EOG Resources 
 The base case model for EOG uses input values shown in Table 7.2 that are the 






Variable Value Source Description 
Drilling cost 
(CAPEX)5 
2,090,000  $ EOG  (Investor 
presentation), 
Rigzone 
Includes rig, rental equipment, 





3,410,000  $ EOG  (Investor 
presentation), 
Rigzone 
Includes fluids, chemicals, 
transportation, formation stimulation, 
services, rental equipment, etc. 
OPEX oil 
equivalent 
12.86 $/boe EOG Resources 
(10-K report) 
Includes lease, well cost, 




75,000 $ Gülen et al. 
2013 
Plug and abandon well once its 
economic life ends. 
Severance tax 4.6 % Railroad 
Commission of 
Texas 




35 % U.S. Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission 




100  % (Assumption) The company is responsible for all the 
costs incurred in the drilling, 
completion, production and 
abandonment of the well. 




300 Bbls/month (Assumption) Wells reaching the end of its economic 
life. 
Royalty 25 % (Assumption) Royalty for the Eagle ford between 22-
28%. 
Oil price 40 $/bbl (Assumption) Flat during the life of the well. 
Gas price 2.28 $/Mscf (Assumption) Flat during the life of the well. 
Table 7.2. Input values for the DCF base case model for EOG Resources. 
 The NPV at a 10% discount rate, both before and after federal income tax, obtained 
from the base case model under the assumptions used are negative; meaning that it is not 
economically viable for EOG to drill a well under the current conditions. The break-even 
analysis suggests that a change in the price of oil, leaving all other variables intact, would 
make it economically viable to drill when the oil price is over 42.00 $/bbl (BFIT) and 47.50 
$/bbl (AFIT). The results for the base case model for EOG are in Figure 7.3. 
                                                 
5 Drilling cost is considered to be 38% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle Ford” 
from Rigzone website www.rigzone.com. 
6 Completion cost is considered to be 62% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle 









Figure 7.3. EOG’s base case cash flow after federal income tax diagram using a discount 
rate of 10%, 40$/bbl, 2.28$/Mscf. 
 From the base case model, the sensitivity analysis for a 20% change in the variables 
inputs show that well economics are most sensitive to the price of oil followed by OPEX. 
Additionally, Figure 7.4 also shows that a change of that magnitude in either variable still 
will not make this well economically feasible considering the NPVAFIT.  
 
 
NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl      (457,815.00) $  
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (1,116,864.86) $  
IRR  AFIT @40$/bbl 1 % 
Break-even price BFIT 42.00 $/bbl 





Figure 7.4. Tornado charts showing EOG’s sensitivity analysis results for a 20% change 
in inputs for NPVBFIT and NPVAFIT. 
 As explained in Chapter 6, the production model using the Logistic Growth method 




case model presented above is for the expected EUR reported on the company’s investor 
presentation. For EOG, when obtaining K, the total cumulative production is higher than 
when using the EUR reported, extending the life of the well and improving its economics. 





Figure 7.5. EOG’s (K unknown) cash flow after federal income tax diagram using a 
discount rate of 10%, 40$/bbl, 2.28$/Mscf. 
7.2.1.2. Probabilistic DCF model EOG Resources 
 Two probabilistic DCF models were developed: A) considers that the initial 
production can vary according to a range of values based on historical data; and B) 
NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl        31,278.99 $  
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl     (875,101.72) $  
IRR  AFIT  @40$/bbl 4 % 
Break-even price BFIT 39.88 $/bbl 




disregards a possible change in initial production. The input values for scenario A are 
presented in Table 7.3.  
 
Variable  Unit Distribution Min Average 
(Mean, Most 
likely) 
Max Std. Dev. 
Initial 
production  
Bbls/year Lognormal - 154,432 - 257,042 
Drilling $ Triangular  1,672,000 2,090,000 2,508,000 - 
Completion $ Triangular  2,728,000 3,410,000 4,092,000 - 
OPEX oil 
equivalent 
$/boe Triangular  10.8 12.86 15.43 - 
Abandonment $ Triangular  60,000 75,000 90,000 - 
Price Oil7 $/bbl Logistic 
(truncated at 
15$/bbl) 
15.00 64.29 - 25.8 
Price Gas8 $/Mscf Triangular 
(truncated at 
1$/Mscf) 
1.00 5.08 10.01 1.74 
Royalty rate % Triangular  20% 25% 30% - 
Input values for Scenario B are the same, except Initial production is not included in the model. 
Table 7.3. Input values and probabilistic distributions for each variable for the EOG 
Resources probabilistic model. 
 For scenario A, decline rates (how much production decreases from one year to the 
next) are assumed to stay the same as in the base case model; however, the calculated 
production will vary because initial production varies. Additionally, production from year 
twelve to year thirteen drops in 83% because the well only produces for two months during 




                                                 
7 The distribution fitting analysis yield two possible distributions for the price of oil. The model was developed using 
the Logistic distribution to follow the parameters from the study done by Gülen et al. 2013. 
8 The results from the distribution fitting analysis yield a minimum natural gas price of 2.62 $/Mscf; however, prices 






Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Decline 49% 41% 35% 30% 26% 23% 21% 19% 17% 16% 
Year 11 12 13        
Decline 15% 14% 85%        
Table 7.4. Decline rates used in the probabilistic DCF model, Scenario A. 
 The results from the two probabilistic models are from 100 simulations of 1000 
interactions each with a mean NPVAFIT of 3.2 million dollars for scenario A and 4.5 million 
dollars for scenario B which are shown in Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7. From the simulation 
results, the chance to have a positive NPVAFIT is 40.8% for scenario A and 78.7% for 
scenario B. A sensitivity analysis (Figure 7.8) was also performed demonstrating that initial 
production rate is the most significant variable when analyzing the economic feasibility of 
drilling a well, followed by price of oil.  
Figure 7.6. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results considering changes in 





Figure 7.7. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results disregarding changes in 
initial production (Scenario B). 
NPVAFIT @10%  





7.2.2. DCF model 2: Pioneer Natural Resources 
7.2.2.1. Base case model Pioneer Natural Resources 
 The base case model uses input values shown in Table 7.5 that are the most likely 
to occur.  
 
Variable Value Source Description 
Drilling cost 
(CAPEX)9 
2,280,000  $ Berman, A., 
Rigzone 
Includes rig, rental equipment, 





3,720,000  $ Berman, A., 
Rigzone 
Includes fluids, chemicals, 
transportation, formation stimulation, 
services, rental equipment, etc. 
OPEX oil 
equivalent 








75,000 $ Gülen et al. 
2013 
Plug and abandon well once its 
economic life ends. 
Severance tax 4.6 % Railroad 
Commission 
of Texas 













100  % (Assumption) The company is responsible for all the 
costs incurred in the drilling, 
completion, production and 
abandonment of the well. 




300 Bbls/month (Assumption) Wells reaching the end of its economic 
life. 
Royalty 25 % (Assumption) Royalty for the Eagle ford between 22-
28%. 
Table 7.5. Input values for the DCF base case model for Pioneer Natural Resources. 
                                                 
9 Drilling cost is considered to be 38% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle Ford” 
from Rigzone website www.rigzone.com. 
10 Completion cost is considered to be 62% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle 




 The NPV, both before and after federal income tax, obtained from the base case 
model under the assumptions used are negative; meaning that it is not economically viable 
for Pioneer to drill a well under the current conditions. The break-even analysis suggests 
that a change in the price of oil, leaving all other variables intact, would make it 
economically viable to drill when the price is over 87.54 $/bbl which differs greatly from 
the results for EOG. A relatively small increase in the price of oil can turn an EOG well 
into a profit earning project; on the contrary, prices would have to increase by 119% 
(compared to the baseline of 40 $/bbl) to make a Pioneer well economically feasible. The 
results for the base case model for Pioneer are in Figure 7.9. 
NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl     (3,522,175.07) $ 
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl     (4,019,787.73) $ 
IRR AFIT @40$/bbl <0 % 
Break-even price BFIT 75.98 $/bbl 
Break-even price AFIT 87.54 $/bbl 
Figure 7.9. Pioneer’s base case cash flow after federal income tax diagram using a 




 From the base case model, the sensitivity analysis results in Figure 7.10 show that 
for Pioneer, the well economics are most sensitive to price of oil and completion cost. This 
is expected given the results from the break-even analysis and the higher completion cots 
that Pioneer has compared to EOG. However, the factors affecting well economics have a 
different order of impact for NPVBFIT and NPVAFIT since the first is mostly dependent on 























Figure 7.10. Tornado charts showing Pioneer’s sensitivity analysis results for a 20% 





 The base case model presented above is for the expected EUR reported on the U.S. 
EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2014. For Pioneer, when obtaining K, the total cumulative 
production is lower than when using the EUR reported, shortening the life of the well and 





Figure 7.11. Pioneer’s (K unknown) cash flow after federal income tax diagram using a 





NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (3,689,578.63) $ 
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (4,263,151.64) $ 
IRR  AFIT  @40$/bbl <0 % 
Break-even price BFIT 80.30 $/bbl 




7.2.2.2. Probabilistic DCF model Pioneer Natural Resources 
 In the same way as with EOG’s analysis, two probabilistic DCF models were 
developed: one taking into account possible changes in initial production (scenario A), and 
the other disregarding these possible changes (scenario B). The input values for Scenario 
A are presented in Table 7.6.  
 
Variable  Unit Distribution Min Average 
(Mean, Most 
likely) 
Max Std. Dev. 
Initial 
production  
Bbls/year Lognormal - 101,846 - 49,709 
Drilling $ Triangular  1,824,000 2,280,000 2,736,000 - 
Completion $ Triangular  2,976,000 3,720,000 4,464,000 - 
OPEX oil 
equivalent 
$/boe Triangular  8.32 10.40 12.48 - 
Abandonment $ Triangular  60,000 75,000 90,000  
Price Oil11 $/bbl Logistic 
(truncated at 
15$/bbl) 
15.00 64.29 - 25.8 
Price Gas12 $/Mscf Triangular  1.00 5.08 10.01 1.74 
Royalty rate % Triangular  20% 25% 30% - 
Input values for Scenario B are the same, except Initial production is not included in the model. 
Table 7.6. Input values and probabilistic distributions for each variable for the Pioneer 






                                                 
11 The distribution fitting analysis yield two possible distributions for the price of oil. The model was developed using 
the Logistic distribution to follow the parameters from the study done by Gülen et al. 2013. 
12 The results from the distribution fitting analysis yield a minimum natural gas price of 2.62 $/Mscf; however, prices 




 For scenario A, decline rates are assumed to stay the same as in the base case model; 
however, the calculated production will vary because initial production varies. The decline 
rates for each year are: 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 
Decline 73% 57% 45% 51% 
Table 7.7. Decline rates used in the probabilistic DCF model, Scenario A. 
 The results from the two probabilistic models are from 100 simulations of 1000 
interactions each with a mean NPVAFIT of -0.95 million dollars for scenario A and -0.41 
million dollars for scenario B which are shown in Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13. From the 
simulation results, the chance to have a positive NPVAFIT is 28.9% for scenario A and 
43.1% for scenario B which are much lower than for EOG. This is in part because Pioneer 
wells have smaller production rates and because the GOR is larger, having wells producing 
more gas and increasing the OPEX. A sensitivity analysis (Figure 7.14) was also performed 
demonstrating that price of oil is the most significant variable when analyzing the economic 





 Figure 7.12. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results considering changes in 
initial production (Scenario A).  
Figure 7.13. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results disregarding changes in 






NPVAFIT @10%  

















7.2.3. DCF model 3: Chesapeake Energy 
7.2.3.1. Base case model Chesapeake Energy 
 The base case model uses input values shown in Table 7.8: 
 
Variable Value Source Description 
Drilling cost 
(CAPEX)13 
2,280,000  $ Berman, A., 
Rigzone 
Includes rig, rental equipment, 





3,720,000  $ Berman, A., 
Rigzone 
Includes fluids, chemicals, 
transportation, formation 




12 $/boe Berman, A. Includes lease, well cost, 




75,000 $ Gülen et al. 
2013 
Plug and abandon well once its 
economic life ends. 
Severance tax 4.6 % Railroad 
Commission 
of Texas 
Baseline Texas severance tax 
for oil and liquids. 
Federal 
income tax 





Federal tax levied on the 
income of corporations. 
Working 
interest (WI) 
100  % (Assumption) The company is responsible for 
all the costs incurred in the 
drilling, completion, production 
and abandonment of the well. 
Discount rate 10  % (Assumption) Commonly used in the industry 
to evaluate projects. 
Economic 
limit 
300 Bbls/month (Assumption) Wells reaching the end of its 
economic life. 
Royalty 25 % (Assumption) Royalty for the Eagle ford 
between 22-28%. 
Table 7.8. Input values for the DCF base case model for Chesapeake. 
 
                                                 
13 Drilling cost is considered to be 38% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle Ford” 
from Rigzone website www.rigzone.com. 
14 Completion cost is considered to be 62% of the total D&C cost based on the article “Costs for drilling the Eagle 




 The NPV, both before and after federal income tax, obtained from the base case 
model under the assumptions used are negative; meaning that it is not economically viable 
for Chesapeake to drill a well under the current conditions. The break-even analysis 
suggests that a change in the price of oil, leaving all other variables intact, would make it 
economically viable to drill when the price is over 89.73 $/bbl given Chesapeake’s costs 
which is not likely to occur in the short term. The results for the base case model for 







Figure 7.15. Chesapeake’s cash flow after federal income tax diagram using a discount 
rate of 10%, 40$/bbl, 2.28$/Mscf. 
NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (3,731,354.49) $ 
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (4,293,604.15) $ 
IRR  AFIT @40$/bbl <0 % 
Break-even price BFIT 78.06 $/bbl 




 From the Chesapeake’s base case model, the sensitivity analysis results in Figure 
7.16 show that the well economics are most sensitive to completion and price of oil, 
followed by completion cost. In the same way as Pioneer, Chesapeake’s break-even price 
is much higher than the baseline of 40 $/bbl; and in the current price environment, it is 
unlikely that prices will increase in the necessary magnitude to make a well economically 

















Figure 7.16. Tornado charts showing Chesapeake’s sensitivity analysis results for a 20% 
change in inputs for NPVBFIT and NPVAFIT. 
 The base case model presented above is for the expected EUR reported on the U.S. 




production is lower than when using the EUR reported, shortening the life of the well and 







Figure 7.17. Chesapeake’s (K unknown) cash flow after federal income tax diagram 











NPV BFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (3,871,679.72) $ 
NPV AFIT @10%, 40$/bbl   (4,498,646.03) $ 
IRR  AFIT  @40$/bbl <0 % 
Break-even price BFIT 78.06 $/bbl 




7.2.3.2. Probabilistic DCF model Chesapeake Energy 
 Two probabilistic DCF models were developed: one taking into account possible 
changes in initial production (scenario A), and the other disregarding these possible 
changes (scenario B). The input values for Scenario A are presented in Table 7.9.  
 
Variable  Unit Distribution Min Average 
(Mean, Most 
likely) 
Max Std. Dev. 
Initial 
production  
Bbls/year Lognormal - 96,095 - 85,599 
Drilling $ Triangular  1,824,000 2,280,000 2,736,000 - 
Completion $ Triangular  2,976,000 3,720,000 4,464,000 - 
OPEX oil 
equivalent 
$/boe Triangular  9.60 12.00 14.40 - 
Abandonment $ Triangular  60,000 75,000 90,000 - 
Price Oil15 $/bbl Logistic 
(truncated at 
15$/bbl) 
15.00 64.29 - 25.8 
Price Gas16 $/Mscf Triangular  1.00 5.08 10.01 1.74 
Royalty rate % Triangular  20% 25% 30% - 
Input values for Scenario B are the same, except Initial production is not included in the model. 
Table 7.9. Input values and probabilistic distributions for each variable for the 
Chesapeake Energy probabilistic model. 
 For scenario A, decline rates are assumed to stay the same as in the base case model; 
however, the calculated production will vary because initial production varies. The decline 
rates for each year are: 
Year 1 2 3 4 
Decline 68% 57% 46% 43% 
Table 7.10. Decline rates used in the probabilistic DCF model, Scenario A. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The distribution fitting analysis yield two possible distributions for the price of oil. The model was developed using 
the Logistic distribution to follow the parameters from the study done by Gülen et al. 2013. 
16 The results from the distribution fitting analysis yield a minimum natural gas price of 2.62 $/Mscf; however, prices 




 The results from the two probabilistic models are from 100 simulations of 1000 
interactions each with a mean NPVAFIT of -1.5 million dollars for scenario A and -1.1 
million dollars for scenario B which are shown in Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19. From the 
simulation results, the chance to have a positive NPVAFIT is 24.0% for scenario A and 
33.7% for scenario B. A sensitivity analysis (Figure 7.20) was also performed 
demonstrating that initial production rate is the most significant variable when analyzing 
the economic feasibility of drilling a well, followed by price of oil.  
 
Figure 7.18. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results considering changes in 





Figure 7.19. Histogram of NPVAFIT (Cum. Cash Flow) results disregarding changes in 
initial production (Scenario B). 
NPVAFIT @10% 






7.3. Summary of results 
 The summary results from the DCF model are in Table 7.11.  
 
  EOG Pioneer Chesapeake 
Base case 
model 
NPVAFIT (MM$) -1.1 -4.0 -4.3 
NPVBFIT (MM$) -0.5 -3.5 -3.7 
Break-even price AFIT 
($/bbl) 
47.5 87.5 89.7 
Probabilistic 
Scenario A 
NPVAFIT (MM$) 3.2 -0.9 -1.5 
Probabilistic 
Scenario B 
NPVAFIT (MM$) 4.5 -0.4 -1.1 
Table 7.11. Summary of results from DCF model. 
 Given the current oil price environment is very difficult to make money with wells 
that break-even at over 40 $/bbl and this is reflected in the results from the DCF models. 
The results show that none of the companies in the analysis is expected to gain revenue 
from drilling new wells at current prices (around 40 $/bbl) considering their particular costs 
and production rates. Given the inputs and assumptions of the probabilistic model, from 
the three companies, EOG is the only one that has a positive NPV. This is because EOG 
has been quick to respond to the low prices by reducing their drilling and completion time; 
therefore, reducing their CAPEX which is one of the principal determinants when 
evaluating new projects. Additionally, the variability in their wells’ production is high; 
some of them can have an accumulated production of over 900,000 barrels of oil for the 





Chapter 8: Conclusions 
Hydrocarbons play an important role in meeting the increasing energy demand, 
particularly for transportation, as developing countries improve their standards of living. 
Therefore, the development of unconventional resources from shale reservoirs will remain 
a significant component in oil and gas production for meeting global energy requirements. 
In contrast to wells in conventional reservoirs, wells in shale rocks need additional 
operations after drilling for them to produce (hydraulic fracturing). There is limited 
experience forecasting production from shale reservoirs which brings great uncertainty 
when evaluating their economics. Hydraulic fracturing composes approximately 60% of 
the drilling and completion costs, making them more expensive to drill than conventional 
reservoirs; and production varies largely within plays and from well to well. 
As technology and knowledge about shale reservoirs evolves, improvements in 
drilling and completion have allowed companies to reduce times, lower total well costs, 
and increase well performance. In 2015, hydraulic fracturing costs dropped over 40% 
compared to 2012. Technological advances play an important part on cost reductions; but 
it also can be partially attributed to the low oil price environment which has resulted in a 
decrease of drilling activity and, consequently, a demand decrease for field services. 
Because of this, service companies have responded to the low demand by reducing their 
fees, which has helped oil and gas companies to keep their operations afloat.  
Additional to the decreasing drilling activity, the wells that are being drilled are not 
being completed. The advantage of having drilled but uncompleted wells is that almost half 
of their cost is considered sunk by the time they start producing, getting a lower break-even 




Oil and gas prices, along with production volumes, are the two most significant 
factors in determining the economic feasibility of drilling new wells. With break-even 
prices above 40 $/bbl is very difficult for companies to be profitable from drilling new 
wells under current cost structures; and many companies have reported negative income 
from operations. The selected companies analyzed in this study, Chesapeake Energy, EOG 
Resources, and Pioneer Natural Resources have reported a net income loss for 2015 of 
14.9, 4.5, and 0.3 billion dollars respectively. Their operating profit margin and net profit 
margin ratios are also negative. 
For companies operating plays that produce different hydrocarbons like the Eagle 
Ford, diversifying their portfolio of oil and gas wells has proven to be helpful in the past 
because of the disparity between oil and natural gas prices; thus, when oil prices are low, 
companies can switch to produce more gas if its price has not fallen as much. However, 
from 2014 to 2016, the prices of both oil and gas have dropped. 
The fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices affect oil and gas companies’ capital 
structures, forcing them to reevaluate non-core assets, lower their operation costs, adjust 
their production, and redefining their strategies to stay afloat when prices are low. For 
example, Pioneer Natural Resources has sold its Eagle Ford Shale midstream business to 
increase the company’s liquidity. 
Hedging is a strategy intended to offset potential losses from fluctuations in prices 
by agreeing to set a future price for a product. However, when the uncertainty in prices is 
high, hedging can be counterproductive in the case prices rise above the hedging price 
while a contract for said price is still in place. Companies benefited from having contracts 




not negotiate new contracts because of the uncertainty and industry specialists forecasting 
increasing prices. 
Companies try to maintain a level of liquidity to meet their financial obligations 
and reassure their investors. Liquidity is measured by the cash ratio. From the three 
companies analyzed, the results for 2015 (Table 8.1) show that Pioneer’s cash ratio is 95%, 
which is a sign of financial strength. The results for EOG and Chesapeake are 39% and 
22% respectively. Although very few companies have a high cash ratio to cover their 
liabilities, a low cash ratio is prejudicial on the eyes of investors, reason why companies 




Table 8.1. Cash ratio 2014 vs. 2015. 
Low oil and gas prices directly affect operating profit margins. During the previous 
abrupt price drop between 2008 and 2009, as well as the current price drop, companies 
experienced a dramatic decrease in their profit margins. 
According to the financial ratios analysis, Pioneer is the company with the best 
results; its high cash-flow-to-debt ratio, and low debt and debt-to-equity ratios make it an 
attractive company to invest in. In contrast, Chesapeake has the worst results, which 
represents high risk for investors. The results from the companies’ financial performance 
is reflected in their per share price. Pioneer’s shares are valued higher than EOG’s, and 
Chesapeake’s are valued the lowest. For EOG, whose financial results are considered good 
 2014 2015  
EOG 62% 39% -22% 
Pioneer 65% 95% 30% 




under the current economic environment, a restructuration of their different business units 
can bring better results in the future. 
For this study, the Eagle Ford Shale was selected to develop a production model 
and a discounted cash flow model for the well economics analysis. The Eagle Ford, located 
in Texas, is an important play because of its capability to produce large volumes of 
hydrocarbons that range from dry gas to gas condensate to volatile oil to black oil. Eagle 
Ford’s proved reserves at year-end 2014 were 5.2 billion barrels of oil, and 23.7 Tscf of 
natural gas which accounted for 30% and 16% of the total U.S. tight oil and shale gas 
reserves for 2014. Although its production decelerated in 2015 because of the low prices, 
it still has a substantial number of drilling rigs operating compared to other basins, which 
is an indication that companies will continue operations in this play. 
Production forecasting is a crucial part of analyzing well economics, especially in 
times of price uncertainty; thus, the selection of the appropriate method to estimate 
production is essential. Given the limited experience in forecasting production from shale 
reservoirs, as well as their importance in boosting hydrocarbons reserves, new forecasting 
methods have been developed. For the Eagle Ford, the method selected in this study is the 
Logistic Growth Model because of the data available and the use of the EUR as the 
maximum production a well can have that solves the problem of over estimation of reserves 
during the life of a well. 
There are two approaches when using the Logistic Growth Model. One approach is 
to assume a maximum production (parameter K on the Logistic Growth equation) using a 
EUR obtained from volumetric calculations; the second approach is to find parameter K. 
For the analyzed companies, the variance from both approaches affects their production 




of the well decreases 11,674 and 10,817 barrels respectively when solving for K, meaning 
that their wells have similar production profiles. In EOG’s case, solving for K increases its 
cumulative production by 70,527 barrels. The difference is possibly because the wells used 
for the model have higher production profiles compared to other wells.  
The discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis is the preferred method to estimate the 
economic feasibility of drilling a new well. The DCF results demonstrate that under the 
cost assumptions and estimated production of the model EOG gets the best results with 
break-even prices bordering the 40 $/bbl compared to the other companies with break-even 
prices above 87 $/bbl for Pioneer and 89 $/bbl for Chesapeake. From the DCF analysis, it 
can be concluded that EOG’s high production volumes and low completion cost are the 




Table 8.2. Break-even price AFIT from the DCF base case model. 
The economic analysis shows that none of the companies in the analysis is expected 
to gain revenue from drilling new wells if oil prices are under 40 $/bbl considering their 
particular costs and production rates. Given the inputs and assumptions of the probabilistic 
model, from the three companies, EOG is the only one that can have a positive net present 
value (NPV) with a small oil price increase. This is because EOG has been quick to respond 
to the low prices by reducing their drilling and completion time, which translate into lower 
costs. Additionally, the variability in their wells’ production gives them an advantage if the 
company concentrates their development operations in sweet spots where a well’s 
cumulative production for the first year can reach 900,000 barrels of oil. 
 EOG Pioneer Chesapeake 




As the selected companies in this study have significant production from the Eagle 
Ford but is not their principal asset (except for EOG), the integration of the financial and 
economic analysis would require to extend the latter for all the plays they have operations 
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